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Abstract	
This	study	of	English	Coronial	practice	raises	a	number	of	questions	about	the	role	played	by	
the	 Coroner	within	 contemporary	 governance.	 Following	 observations	 at	 over	 20	 inquests	
into	 possible	 suicides	 and	 in‐depth	 interviews	 with	 six	 Coroners,	 three	 preliminary	 issue	
emerged,	all	of	which	pointed	to	a	broader	and,	in	many	ways,	more	significant	issue.	These	
preliminary	 issues	are	concerned	with	 (1)	 the	existence	of	considerable	 slippages	between	
different	 Coroners	 over	 which	 deaths	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 classified	 as	 suicide;	 (2)	 the	 high	
standard	of	proof	required	and	immense	pressure	faced	by	Coroners	from	family	members	at	
inquest	 to	reach	any	verdict	other	than	suicide,	which	significantly	depresses	 likely	suicide	
rates;	and	(3)	Coroners	feeling	no	professional	obligation,	either	individually	or	collectively,	
to	 contribute	 to	 the	 production	 of	 consistent	 and	 useful	 social	 data	 regarding	 suicide,	
arguably	rendering	comparative	suicide	statistics	relatively	worthless.	These	concerns	lead,	
ultimately,	 to	 the	 second	 more	 important	 question	 about	 the	 role	 expected	 of	 Coroners	
within	 social	 governance	 and	 within	 an	 effective,	 contemporary	 democracy.	 That	 is,	 are	
Coroners	 the	principal	 officers	 in	 the	public	 administration	of	 death;	 or	 are	 they,	 first	 and	
foremost,	 a	 crucial	 part	 of	 the	 grieving	 process,	 one	 that	 provides	 important	 therapeutic	
interventions	into	the	mental	and	emotional	health	of	the	community?		
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Introduction:	The	coronial	gate‐keeping	of	suicide	statistics	
Much	 is	often	made	of	 changes	over	 time	 in	our	published	 suicide	 rates.	As	 a	 society,	we	are	
relieved	when	we	are	informed	that	fewer	people	are	ending	their	own	lives	(Australian	Bureau	
of	 Statistics	 2012),	 confused	 when	 we	 are	 told	 exactly	 the	 opposite	 (Haesler	 2010),	 and	
concerned	 when	 our	 own	 rates	 are	 compared	 unfavourably	 with	 other	 nations	 and	 peoples	
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(Georgatos	2013).	It	is	often	difficult	to	ascertain	the	precise	trajectory	of	our	suicide	rates,	let	
alone	where	we	stand	in	relation	to	anyone	else.		
	
The	difficulty	here	is	that	suicide	statistics	are	notoriously	unreliable,	with	most	research	in	the	
area	 suggesting	 that	 alternative	 ways	 of	 counting,	 classifying,	 and	 reporting	 would	 lead	 to	
significantly	 higher	 rates	 of	 suicide	 (Harrison,	 Abou	Elnour	 and	Pointer	 2009).	 This	 systemic	
under‐counting	may	be	for	a	range	of	reasons.	Walker,	Chen	and	Madden	(2008)	contend	that	
factors	 such	 as	 disparities	 between	 jurisdictions,	 lack	 of	 standardisation	 in	 the	 reporting	 of	
Coronial	deaths,	and	issues	over	forms	for	police	reports	put	a	particular	slant	on	the	data.	They	
also	point	to	the	reluctance	of	some	Coroners	to	reach	a	finding	of	suicide	in	the	first	place.	It	is	
this	final	factor	that	constitutes	the	central	problematic	of	this	paper.	After	all,	 if	Coroners	are	
reticent	 about	 reaching	 suicide	 verdicts,	 what	 are	 they	 there	 for?	 Why	 bother	 with	 suicide	
inquests	at	all?		
	
From	the	inception	of	the	role	in	the	eleventh	century,	one	of	the	central	responsibilities	of	the	
Coroner	has	been	 to	 investigate	deaths	 ‘considered	worthy	of	 inquiry’	 (Burney	2000:	3).	This	
would	 include	 deaths	 such	 as	 those	 by	 accident,	 where	 there	 was	 some	 suspicion	 of	
wrongdoing,	and	those	by	suicide.	This	eventually	became	seen	as	a	largely	administrative	task,	
conducted	 in	 a	 non‐adversarial	 environment,	 as	 part	 of	 the	 effective	 administration	 of	 the	
populace.		
	
However,	 in	addition	 to	 the	recording,	assessing	and	categorising	of	death,	 the	Coroner’s	 role	
has	more	recently	expanded,	throughout	all	Commonwealth	countries,	to	incorporate	elements	
of	social	management	and	prevention	of	harm	(Victorian	Institute	of	Forensic	Medicine	2013):		
	
Much	of	the	operation	of	the	office	of	Coroner	or	Coroners	courts	in	Australia	is	
centered	on	injury	and	death	prevention,	with	the	Coroner	empowered	to	make	
recommendations	 on	 matters	 of	 public	 health	 and	 safety	 and	 judicial	
administration.	
	
Consequently,	the	Coroner	is	not	only	an	essential	part	of	our	legal	system	in	that	they	manage	
the	relationship	between	the	State	and	the	death	of	its	citizens	and,	in	particular,	those	deaths	
deemed	 to	warrant	 investigation;	 now	 they	 are	 also	 an	 important	 element	 of	 the	 process	 by	
which	the	State	accumulates	social	data	which	are	used	to	identify	problems	and	shape	policy.	
The	 difficulty	 here	 is	 clear:	 if	 Coroners	 are	 reluctant	 to	 reach	 a	 finding	 of	 suicide,	 as	Walker,	
Chen	and	Madden	(2008)	contend,	 then	 their	role	 in	production	of	suicide	statistics,	which	 in	
turn	direct	social	policies	and	programs	(targeting,	 for	example,	suicide	prevention),	becomes	
problematic.		
	
In	 addition	 to	 these	 two	 roles	 –	 death	 investigation	 and	 social	 management	 –	 this	 research	
suggests	that	there	is	a	third	function,	one	which	may	often	sit	at	odds	with	the	first	two.		Our	
research	 suggests	 that	 Coroners	 have	 been	 allocated	 or,	 perhaps	 more	 accurately,	 have	
allocated	 themselves	 a	 role	 in	 the	 process	 of	 giving	 closure	 to	 grieving	 families.	 This	
‘therapeutic’	role	may	often	result	in	Coroners	managing	inquests	in	ways	that	go	well	beyond	
the	 simple	 finding	 of	 facts,	 and	 which	 has	 significant	 implications	 for	 the	 administrative	
elements	of	the	task.	
	
Democracy	and	the	Coronial	inquest	
This	research	investigates	the	English	Coronial	Inquest	system,	particularly	as	it	relates	to	the	
investigation	 of	 potential	 suicides.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 also	 makes	 some	 comparisons	 with	 how	
similar	deaths	are	managed	in	Australia.	There	are	a	number	of	important	differences	between	
the	 two	systems.	The	most	significant	concerns	 the	role	played	by	 the	 inquest.	 In	England,	all	
deaths	 that	 are	 considered	 worthy	 of	 inquiry	 –	 which	 includes	 potential	 suicides	 –	 are	
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necessarily	the	subject	of	a	public	inquest.	In	Australia,	the	same	deaths	are	assessed	solely	on	
the	basis	of	the	documentary	evidence	unless	specific	circumstances	dictate	otherwise.		
	
It	is	important	to	note	that	the	role	of	the	Coroner	and	the	functioning	of	the	Coronial	inquest	
are	 not	 just	 matters	 of	 abstract	 social	 and	 administrative	 interest.	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that,	
historically,	both	are	central	to	how	English	democracy	came	to	be	shaped	and	understood	and,	
as	such,	questions	about	how	well	the	Coronial	system	works,	and	about	how	different	former	
British	colonies	have	chosen	to	refract	this	original	office	for	their	own	purposes,	continue	to	be	
asked.	 In	Bodies	of	Evidence,	 Burney	 (2000)	 examines	 the	historical	 role	played	by	 the	public	
inquest	in	placing	important	checks	on	State	abuse	of	power,	by	insisting	that	all	prison	deaths	–	
and	most	 famously,	 the	deaths	of	18	protesting	workers	killed	by	 in	 the	Peterloo	Massacre	 in	
1819	–	face	public	scrutiny	and	judgment.	This	notion	that	questionable	deaths	be	the	subject	of	
public	 investigation,	 an	 investigation	 accessible	 to	 and	 readily	 understood	 by	 all	 interested	
parties	within	the	community,	became	central	to	English	conceptions	of	justice	and	democracy.	
Indeed,	much	 of	 Burney’s	 book	 examines	 the	 complex	 tension	 that	 arose	within	 the	 Coronial	
inquest	 between	 the	 voices	 of	 this	 participatory	 tradition	 and	 the	 bearers	 of	 new,	 scientific	
knowledge	that	sought	to	bring	medical	expertise	to	the	inquest	process,	often	at	the	expense	of	
public	understanding	and	involvement.	
	
…	the	benefit	of	expert	governance,	particularly	in	an	era	of	mass	democracy,	was	
that	 it	 could	 draw	 upon	 advanced,	 universalizing	 knowledge	 in	 the	 service	 of	
public	 well‐being	 and,	 ultimately,	 public	 education.	 Its	 shortcomings,	 however,	
lay	 in	 its	 tendency	 to	 stifle	 the	 very	 instruments	 of	 civic	 education	 –	 the	 local,	
participatory	 institutions	 in	 which	 an	 active,	 informed,	 and	 morally	 elevated	
citizenry	was	forged.	(Burney	2000:	9)		
	
Arguably,	 this	 tension	–	or	at	 least	a	modern	variant	on	 it	 (that	 is,	between	medicine	and	 the	
law)	–	can	still	be	clearly	seen	within	the	fabric	of	contemporary	death	investigation	(Carpenter	
and	 Tait	 2010).	 Certainly	 there	 was	 some	 expectation	 that	 this	 tension	 would	 be	 evidenced	
within	this	study,	and	there	were	some	minor	examples	of	this.	However,	what	was	uncovered	
was	a	far	more	significant	tension	between	the	governmental	and	the	pastoral	functions	of	the	
Coroner,	between	what	appears	to	be	an	 investigative	and	preventative	role	–	 investigative	 in	
delivering	an	appropriate	finding;	and	preventative	in	contributing	the	necessary	data	to	inform	
social	policy	–	and	a	therapeutic	role	–	in	looking	after	the	well‐being	of	bereaved	families.	This	
paper	will	address	this	specific	issue	in	some	detail.		
	
Coronial	inquests	and	interviews	
This	 study	was	 conducted	within	 one	 geographic	 area	 in	 England.	 The	Research	 consisted	 of	
observations	made	at	public	inquests	into	possible	suicides,	followed	by	interviews	with	six	of	
the	coroners	who	had	presided	over	the	above	inquests.1	
	
From	the	observations	made	at	 inquests,	 three	relevant	conclusions	were	drawn.2	First,	 there	
appears	 to	 be	 no	 single	model	 for	 running	 a	 Coronial	 inquest.	 Far	 from	being	 a	 uniform	 and	
consistent	 element	 of	 the	 English	 legal	 system,	 the	 Coronial	 inquest	 takes	 a	 wide	 range	 of	
different	 forms.	 Though	 the	 Coroners	 are	 uniformly	 professional,	 patient	 and	 skilled	 at	
managing	grieving	families,	each	Coroner	seems	to	organise	their	own	courtrooms	as	they	see	
fit.	 For	 example,	 some	 Coroners	 focused	 largely	 on	 testimony	 of	 the	 police	 and	 the	 bereaved	
family;	others	placed	greater	emphasis	on	 the	available	scientific	evidence;	 some	appeared	 to	
prefer	 a	 brief	 inquest,	 focused	 on	 reaching	 a	 finding	 as	 quickly	 as	 possible;	 others	 appeared	
willing	to	allow	anyone	who	felt	they	had	something	to	contribute	the	possibility	of	doing	so	if	
they	wished.		
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Second,	 to	 be	 able	 to	 reach	 a	 finding	 of	 suicide,	 the	 standard	 of	 proof	 is	 extremely	 high.	 In	
England,	 suicide	 determination	 is	 based	 around	 the	 criminal	 standard	 of	 ‘beyond	 reasonable	
doubt’,	 whereas	 the	 Australian	 model	 has	 adopted	 the	 civil	 standard	 of	 ‘on	 the	 balance	 of	
probabilities’.	On	the	basis	of	the	observations	made	at	the	20	inquests,	the	required	standard	of	
‘beyond	a	reasonable	doubt’,	as	deployed	within	the	Coronial	inquest,	appears	an	exceptionally	
difficult	level	to	attain.		
	
Finally,	the	Coroners	are	often	placed	under	significant	pressure	throughout	the	proceedings	by	
the	deceased’s	 family	not	 to	bring	 in	 a	 finding	of	 suicide.	Almost	 all	 inquests	 are	 attended	by	
family	members	 and,	 even	where	 the	Coroners	 appear	 inclined	 to	 accept	 a	 finding	of	 suicide,	
attempts	 are	 still	 continually	 made	 to	 control	 the	 general	 narrative.	 These	 efforts	 at	 control	
extended	beyond	 the	Coroner	 to	courtroom	staff,	 to	any	newspaper	reporters	present,	and	 to	
anyone	else	present	at	the	proceedings,	including	Australian	academic	researchers.		
	
However,	 from	 the	 semi‐structured	 interviews	 conducted	with	Coroners,	 three	 further	 issues	
emerged	which	are	not	only	tied	to	the	above	observations	but	which	also	raise	some	important	
questions	 about	 just	 what	 is	 going	 on	 in	 Coronial	 suicide	 investigations.	 Having	 set	 the	
groundwork	by	addressing	these	three	issues,	the	subsequent	question	about	the	governmental	
role	of	the	Coroner	and	the	degree	to	which	this	role	extends	beyond	the	administrative	into	the	
therapeutic,	can	be	addressed.		
	
1. Inconsistency	between	Coroners	
Firstly,	there	exist	considerable	slippages	between	different	Coroners	as	to	what	is	likely	to	be	
considered	 suicide,	 and	 what	 is	 not.	 There	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 a	 number	 of	 reasons	 for	 this.	 As	
mentioned	 previously,	 there	 has	 always	 been	 tension	 within	 Coronial	 death	 investigations	
between	those	who	regard	the	process	as	a	useful	application	of	the	scientific	quest	for	truth	–	
often	exemplified	by	a	different	approach	to	the	use	of	invasive	autopsy	–	and	those	who	place	
far	 more	 weight	 upon	 legal	 processes	 and	 information	 gathered	 at	 the	 scene	 of	 death.	 This	
tension	extends	to	disagreement	of	who	should,	and	who	should	not,	be	eligible	to	be	a	Coroner:		
	
I	have	nothing	against	my	medical	colleagues,	but	I	do	think	it’s	a	job	for	a	lawyer	
…	I	think	that	Inquest	law	is	now	becoming	so	complex	–	it’s	nothing	to	do	with	
intellectual	ability,	but	I	think	you	need	legal	training,	and	to	have	performed	in	
the	court	system	to	really	be	able	to	deal	with	it.	(Coroner	4)	
	
A	 further	 reason	 for	 a	 seeming	 lack	 of	 consistency	 in	 reaching	 findings	 of	 suicide	 involves	
considerable	differences	in	levels	of	experience,	in	that	more	practiced	Coroners	are	often	able	
to	 better	 manage	 the	 complexities	 of	 procedure,	 evidence	 and	 family	 management	 than	 are	
those	 with	 less	 time	 in	 the	 position.	 That	 said,	 additional	 experience	 does	 not	 necessarily	
translate	 into	having	 the	 confidence	 to	bring	 in	 a	difficult	 finding	of	 suicide;	 in	 fact,	 often	 the	
reverse	is	apparent:		
	
The	newer	coroners	are	probably	more	 likely	 to	bring	 in	a	 suicide	verdict	 than	
the	older	ones	…	well	 I	 think	it’s	because	the	older	ones	–	suicide	probably	had	
more	 of	 a	 stigma	 in	 those	 days	 and	 there	were	 some	 Coroners	who	will	 go	 to	
almost	any	lengths	not	to	bring	in	a	suicide	verdict.	(Coroner	1)	
	
In	addition	to	the	issue	of	experience,	ability	in	the	role	of	the	Coroner	and	disparate	levels	of	
training	are	also	issues.	In	England,	there	is	no	centralised,	standardising	Coronial	Service	that	
might	provide	training	and	guidance.	Coroners	are	pretty	much	on	their	own:		
	
When	 I	 started,	 there	was	 no	 training	whatsoever	 for	 Coroners	…	 the	 Coroner	
Society	 of	 England	 and	 Wales	 established	 some	 training	 for	 Coroners;	 it	 was	
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pretty	 limited	with	 a	 very	 small	 budget.	 There’s	 no	 requirement	 for	us	 to	have	
that	 training	…	 so	 there	 is	 inevitably	 a	 lack	of	 consistency,	 and	 there	 are	 some	
people	who	do	not	go	on	any	training	at	all.	(Coroner	2)	
	
There	are	 also	variations	 in	 funding	and	 responsibilities.	 Some	Coroners	 are	well‐funded	and	
well‐resourced;	others	are	not,	which	affects	their	ability	to	complete	the	work	effectively	and	
consistently:	
	
You	go	and	see	Coroners	in	some	other	parts	of	the	country	and	they’re	working	
out	 of	 the	 back	 kitchen,	 they’re	 working	 out	 of	 a	 Portacabin	 …	 there	 was	 one	
Coroner	starting	to	hold	an	inquest,	could	only	have	the	village	hall	 for	the	day,	
had	to	move	to	the	next	town	to	actually	conclude	the	inquest.	(Coroner	3)	
	 	
While	these	are	interesting	and	relevant	in	their	own	right,	for	the	purposes	of	this	paper,	one	
final	reason	for	significant	slippages	between	Coroners	over	findings	of	suicide	is	perhaps	more	
important	 and	more	 telling	 than	 the	 others.	 This	 is	 apparent	 differences	 of	 opinion	 over	 the	
central	 role	of	 the	Coroner.	Some	Coroners	 take	a	 fairly	hard	 line	over	 their	determinations	–	
understanding	their	role	as	fundamentally	administrative	–	while	others	see	their	role	in	a	more	
pastoral	light,	pertaining	first	and	foremost	to	helping	the	grieving	family.		
	
I’m	not	 a	 social	 service.	 I’m	 supposed	 to	be	making	an	 inquiry	on	behalf	 of	 the	
State,	not	on	behalf	of	the	family,	and	if	this	person	has	taken	their	own	life,	and	
the	evidence	satisfies	me	beyond	a	 reasonable	doubt	 that	 this	 is	 the	case,	what	
verdict	 can	 I	 possibly	 come	 to	 other	 that	 that	 they	 have	 taken	 their	 own	 life?	
(Coroner	6)	
	
This	can	be	directly	contrasted	with:	
	
I	often	engage	the	family	and	will	say,	‘I’m	thinking	along	these	lines.	What’s	your	
view?’	 Sometimes	 if	 you	 carry	 the	 families	 with	 you,	 it’s	 more	 cathartic	 –	 it’s	
totally	wrong,	but	it’s	a	more	cathartic	experience	for	them	…	you	put	the	family	
at	the	heart	of	the	inquiry.	(Coroner	4)	
		
It’s	 all	 about	 enabling	 people	 to	 get	 on	with	 their	 lives	…	 giving	 them	 closure,	
actually	lifting	them	up	and	explaining	things	…	it’s	not	what	the	law	tells	us	it’s	
about,	but	that’s	the	reality	of	what	it	should	do	…	(Coroner	3)	
	
2. Underestimating	rates	of	suicide	
The	second	issue	to	emerge	from	the	interviews	involves	the	general	admission	by	the	Coroners	
that	the	Coronial	inquest	process	acts	to	depress	suicide	rates,	with	this	observation	supported	
by	most	research	in	the	area	(Harrison	et	al.	2009;	Walker	et	al.	2008).	The	Coroners	note	that	
the	standard	of	proof	is	at	the	very	highest	end	of	‘beyond	reasonable	doubt’.	That	is,	the	notion	
of	 ‘beyond	reasonable	doubt’	 is	not	 a	 singular	measure;	 it	 is	 a	 continuum,	with	 the	 finding	of	
suicide	placed	at	the	furthest	end.		
	
The	 standard	 of	 proof	 of	 beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt	 as	 applied	 in	 the	 public	
prosecution	services	is	quite	a	lot	lower	really	…	I	doubt	many	people	would	be	
prosecuted	 if	you	needed	the	 level	of	sureness	you	need	 for	a	suicide	verdict	…	
Don’t	misunderstand	that	there’s	only	one	standard	of	proof,	which	is	beyond	a	
reasonable	doubt,	but	then	of	course	it’s	up	to	you	to	interpret	what’s	beyond	a	
reasonable	doubt.	(Coroner	1)	
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Consequently,	 findings	 of	 suicide	 can	 be	 relatively	 hard	 to	 attain,	 which	 means	 that	 many	
suicides	 are	 classified	 as	 something	 else,	 even	 when	 most	 impartial	 observers	 might	 have	
reasonably	concluded	death	by	suicide.	This	results	in	a	significant	reduction	in	the	numbers	of	
suicides	recorded	each	year.		
	
Every	Coroner	does	 things	differently,	and	 like	 I	 say,	a	rough	rule	of	 thumb	–	 if	
you’re	 looking	 at	 statistics,	 I	 can	 guarantee	 that	 suicide	 is	 under‐represented.	
Roughly,	I	say	you	could	add	a	third	onto	the	figure	…	(Coroner	4)	
	
We’re	left	with	about	300	cases	a	year	which	we	inquest	…	I	would	say	we	do	50	
suicides	 a	 year	 out	 of	 300	 –	 genuine	 suicide	 verdicts.	 Then	 there	 are	 probably	
about	another	30	odd,	which	probably	are.	(Coroner	1)	
	
This	 institutional	 underestimation	 of	 suicides	 is	 not	 solely	 a	 function	 of	 an	 insistence	upon	 a	
criminal	standard	of	proof	 for	reaching	such	a	determination.	From	the	observations	made	at	
the	inquests	and	from	the	statements	made	by	the	Coroners	during	interview,	it	is	clear	that	the	
presence	 of	 the	 family	 –	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 continually	 lobbying	 for	 any	 finding	 other	 than	
suicide	–	also	acts	to	depress	suicide	rates.	Historically,	the	desperation	of	the	family	not	to	have	
a	suicide	finding	by	the	coroner	is	understandable:		
	
If	you	go	back	in	English	law	150	years	or	so,	suicide	was	an	absolutely	dreadful	
thing	to	do	to	yourself.	You	were	cheating	on	God;	you	would	not	have	any	hope	
of	resurrection	…	At	that	stage	Coroners	had	been	giving	burial	orders	which	said	
that	 the	 deceased	 must	 be	 buried	 at	 the	 junction	 of	 four	 roads	 with	 a	 stake	
through	 their	 body	–	 and	no,	 I’m	not	 getting	mixed	up	with	Transylvania	here,	
this	 is	 really	what	 it	 said	–	where	beggars	 could	 spit	upon	 their	 graves	 as	 they	
went	past.	(Coroner	5)	
	
Some	 Coroners	 profess	 relative	 immunity	 to	 the	 wishes	 of	 family	 members.	 While	 they	 are	
aware	that	the	grieving	family	will	often	engage	in	both	overt	and	covert	attempts	to	sway	their	
opinion	and	hence	the	finding	of	the	inquest,	they	adopt	the	standard	stated	approach:	that	the	
role	 of	 Coroner	 is	 primarily	 about	 reaching	 a	 legitimate	 finding	 as	 to	 the	 cause	 and	
circumstances	of	death.		
	
A	 Coroner	 has	 to	 divorce	 his	 own	 sensibilities	 from	 his	 legal	 responsibilities.	
(Coroner	5)	
	
It	boils	down	to	evidence	as	far	as	I’m	concerned.	It	boils	down	to	evidence,	and	if	
there’s	 doubt	…	 I	wouldn’t	 be	 persuaded	 just	 because	 they’re	 all	 shouting	 [the	
family]	…	I’m	afraid	you’ve	just	got	to	be	robust	about	it	and	stick	by	your	guns.	
(Coroner	2)	
	
In	 contrast,	 other	 Coroners	 are	 aware	 that	 such	 wishes	 will	 often	 factor	 into	 their	 overall	
decision‐making	process.	That	is,	they	appear	to	consider	that	taking	into	account	family	wishes	
is	a	valid	component	of	reaching	an	appropriate	finding.		
	
I	 think	a	 lot	of	Coroners	–	me	included	–	sometimes	take	a	sympathetic	view	of	
the	family,	and	perhaps,	well,	you	know	…	why	leave	the	family	with	the	stigma	of	
this,	when	we	can	actually	make	their	situation	better?	…	So,	I	think	Coroners,	to	
some	 extent,	 are	 softies,	 and	might	 not	necessarily	 bite	 the	bullet	 and	 say,	 yes,	
this	is	suicide.	(Coroner	4)	
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They	tend	to	come	in	numbers.	If	you’ve	got	10	members	of	the	family	with	their	
eyes	burning	on	you,	and	they	really	don’t	want	that	verdict,	it	is	very,	very	hard	
…	(Coroner	4)	
	
Clearly,	 there	 is	 division	 between	 those	 Coroners	 for	 whom	 the	 job	 remains	 steadfastly	
administrative,	 and	 those	 who	 see	 their	 principal	 task	 as	 providing	 comfort	 and	 closure	 to	
grieving	 families.	 Indeed,	 advocates	 of	 the	 administrative	 approach	 to	Coronial	 practice	 often	
have	little	time	for	those	who	seem	prepared	to	be	swayed	by	the	influence	of	the	family.	They	
consider	 that	Coroners	have	a	 clearly‐defined	 task	 to	accomplish,	 and	criticise	 those	who	shy	
away	from	the	tougher	elements	of	that	task.		
	
They’re	not	up	 to	 the	 job	…	 if	 they	can	say	 to	anybody	 that	 it	 [family	pressure]	
makes	 a	 difference	 to	 my	 judgment,	 they	 shouldn’t	 be	 doing	 the	 job,	 they	
should’ve	left.	They’re	not	a	fit	and	proper	Coroner.	(Coroner	3)	
	
3. Coroners	versus	statisticians	
The	 final	 issue	 that	 emerged	 from	 the	 semi‐structured	 interviews	 concerns	 the	 relationship	
between	the	Coronial	suicide	inquest	and	the	production	of	suicide	data.	It	is	clear	that	Coroners	
feel	no	obligation	to	make	their	findings	amenable	to	the	production	of	useful	suicide	statistics.	
Most	regard	their	task	as	a	fundamentally	administrative	function	concerning	the	management	
of	particular	kinds	of	death	as	well	as	helping	families,	where	possible,	deal	with	the	passing	of	a	
loved	one;	however,	 they	do	not	 see	 their	 job	as	 facilitating	 the	recording	of	 such	deaths	 into	
meaningful	numbers:		
	
The	 statisticians	will	 try	 and	drill	 down,	 and	 sometimes	we’ll	 get	psychological	
surveys	 of	my	 files	…	 they	 go	 through	 and	 the	 try	 and	 figure	 out	what	 the	 file	
means	so	 they	get	 the	 true	suicide	picture.	So	 I	said;	 ‘Hang	on	a	second;	 I	sit	 in	
court,	 I’ve	heard	the	evidence,	 I’ve	made	a	 judgment	on	what’s	happening	here,	
and	 you	want	 to	 go	 through	 the	 same	material	 to	 see	 if	 you	 come	 to	 the	 same	
judgment	 or	 a	 different	 judgment?	 They	 said	 ‘Yeah’.	 ‘That’s	 fine,’	 I	 said,	 ‘what	
you’re	doing	is	meaningless,	but	just	do	it	if	you	want	to.’	(Coroner	3)	
	
We’ve	 now	 introduced	 narrative	 verdicts	 which	 are	 here	 to	 stay	 as	 far	 as	 I’m	
concerned,	and	are	a	huge	boon	for	the	public,	and	a	huge	benefit	to	the	Coroner’	
court.	So	I’m	not	very	sympathetic	to	somebody	coming	along	and	saying:	 ‘well,	
you’re	disturbing	our	statistics’.	(Coroner	6)	
	
Those	Coroners	who	place	greater	weight	than	others	upon	the	non‐administrative	elements	of	
their	 job	 –	 that	 is,	 those	 who	 emphasise	 a	 more	 pastoral	 approach	 to	 running	 an	 inquest	 –	
appear	 to	have	 less	 concern	 for	 the	difficulties	 faced	by	 those	 coding	 statistical	data	 for	 later	
interpretation:		
	
You	know,	I	do	the	job	as	I	think	fit,	and	by	trying	to	put	families	first.	I	think	I’m	
as	guilty	as	anyone	sometimes	of	being	a	 softy.	 I	 appreciate	 that	 it	must	 rankle	
statisticians	 completely,	 but	 in	 terms	 of	 perhaps	 the	 way	 people	 can	 live	 with	
themselves	thereafter,	I	think	that	probably	is	a	better	aim.	(Coroner	4)	
	
You	 can	make	a	difference	because	one	of	 the	non‐statutory	 functions	which	 is	
not	 recorded	 anywhere	 but	 a	 lot	 of	 us	 do	 it,	 is	 to	 try	 and	 help	 the	 family	 in	
closure,	 without	 being	 paternalistic.	 It	 can	 be	 a	 cathartic	 exercise	 and	 to	 that	
extent	 I	 think	you’ve	 justified	your	own	existence,	never	mind	 the	State’s	work	
which	you	do.	(Coroner	5)	
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Two	issues	emerge	from	this	observation.	First,	by	adopting	this	approach,	Coroner’s	become	–	
consciously	or	otherwise	–	the	principal	gatekeepers	of	our	suicide	statistics.	In	deciding	which	
deaths	are	recorded	as	suicides,	often	for	reasons	above	and	beyond	the	ontology	of	the	deaths	
themselves,	 Coroners	 can	 ultimately	 determine	 whether	 suicide	 rates	 are	 increasing	 or	
decreasing,	 based	 not	 upon	 the	 specifics	 of	 each	 case	 but,	 rather,	 upon	 their	 perceived	
responsibility	to	grieving	families,	with	all	the	concomitant	implication	this	may	have	for	suicide	
prevention	policy	formulation	and	funding.		
	
Continuing	on	from	the	problems	and	observations	raised	above,	the	second	issue	concerns	the	
more	 important	question	about	the	role	we	expect	Coroners	 to	play	within	social	governance.	
Are	Coroners	the	most	important	cog	in	the	administrative	machine	charged	with	recording	the	
death	 of	 citizens,	 or	 are	 they	 now	 positioned	 as	 an	 appropriate	 part	 of	 the	 grieving	 process,	
providing	 important	 therapeutic	 interventions	 into	 the	 mental	 and	 emotional	 health	 of	 the	
community?	 One	 further	 question	 follows	 on	 from	 this	 issue:	 are	 these	 two	 roles	 mutually	
exclusive;	 or	 is	 it	 possible	 to	 include	 both	within	 a	 broader	 understanding	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	
Coroner	within	contemporary	governance?		
	
The	therapeutic	Coroner	
The	precise	role	of	the	Coronial	inquest	is	not	necessarily	an	easy	one	to	define.	As	previously	
discussed,	 Burney	 (2000)	 has	 articulated	 the	 inquest’s	 function	 within	 modern	 democratic	
processes	as	not	only	a	check	on	State	abuse	of	power	but	also	as	a	site	for	new	scientific	truth‐
claims	 to	 be	 aired	 and	 to	 gain	momentum.	 The	 Coroners	 in	 this	 study	 themselves	 voiced	 an	
array	of	other	explanations	as	to	its	ongoing	importance.	For	example:		
	
Part	 of	 the	 whole	 purpose	 of	 an	 inquest	 is	 to	 quell	 rumour.	 It’s	 a	 very	 old‐
fashioned	thing	to	say,	but	it	is.	(Coroner	2)	
	
While	 this	 may	 be	 true,	 arguably	 the	 fundamental	 purpose	 of	 the	 modern	 inquest	 and,	 by	
extension,	 the	 position	 of	 the	 Coroner	 itself	 has	 now	 been	 subsumed	 within	 the	 general	
governance	–	governance	in	a	Foucaultian	(1977)	sense	–	of	contemporary	populations.		
	
Suicide	and	governance	
Towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 the	 governmental	 process	 started	 whereby	 the	
social	body	was	 transformed	 from	an	undifferentiated	mob	 into	a	workable	and	more	readily	
governable	 population;	 one	 comprised	 of	 noticeable	 features	 and	 patterns	 as	 well	 as	
differentiated	individuals,	each	with	their	own	discernible	capacities	and	characteristics.	While	
this	process	began	in	a	fairly	modest	way,	it	enabled	disparate	organs	of	government	to	sketch	
out	 a	 preliminary	 map	 of	 some	 of	 the	 most	 important	 contours	 of	 community	 life.	 These	
contours	included,	for	example,	how	many	people	lived	in	particular	locations,	how	they	were	
employed,	how	they	lived,	and	importantly	for	the	purposes	of	this	paper,	how	long	they	lived,	
and	how	they	died	(Tait	2013).	
	
Over	 the	 ensuing	 two	 hundred	 years,	 mortality	 rates	 have	 proven	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	 most	
important	statistics	within	the	management	of	populations,	principally	because	the	health	of	the	
population	had	rapidly	become	one	of	 the	central	 functions	of	 the	exercise	of	political	power:	
that	 is,	 providing	 a	 social	 milieu	 that	 promised	 physical	 well‐being,	 health,	 and	 optimal	
longevity.	As	Foucault	 (1984:	277)	states:	 ‘The	 imperative	of	health	…	[is]	at	once	 the	duty	of	
each	and	the	objective	of	all’.	Consequently,	as	the	nineteenth	century	progressed,	characterised	
by	what	Hacking	(1982)	refers	 to	as	 ‘an	avalanche	of	printed	numbers’,	 it	became	possible	 to	
know	–	and	 important	 to	know	–	when	people	died,	how	they	died,	where	they	died,	and	how	
many	 died	 by	 their	 own	 hand.	 After	 all,	 a	 healthy	 population	 is	 not	 a	 population	with	 a	 high	
suicide	 rate.	 Following	 this	 logic,	 the	 issue	 of	 suicide	 became	 the	 focus	 of	 immense	 concern	
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towards	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	culminating	in	the	publication	of	Durkheim’s	seminal	
sociological	text,	Suicide	(1897),	amongst	others.	As	Tierney	(2010:	383)	notes:		
	
…	 the	 return	 of	 the	 troubling	 issue	 of	 suicide	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 twenty‐first	
century	 is	 just	 as	 sociologically	 significant	 as	 the	 issue	 was	 in	 the	 nineteenth	
century,	when	it	first	caught	the	attention	of	Peuchet,	Marx	and	Durkheim.	In	the	
context	of	 the	history	of	government	 that	Foucault	presented	his	courses	 in	the	
late	1970s,	 the	nineteenth‐century	sociological	 fascination	with	suicide	appears	
as	part	of	the	establishment	of	a	new	form	of	political	rationality	that	governs	the	
conduct	 of	 individuals	 based	 upon	 the	 patterns	 and	 regularities	 revealed	 by	
statistical	analyses	of	the	population.		
	
Arguably,	 unless	 such	 statistical	 analyses	 measure	 what	 they	 claim	 to	 measure	 –	 whether	
dealing	with	suicide	or	any	of	the	other	problems	which	form	the	raison	d’être	for	all	programs	
of	 intervention	 –	 then	 they	 defeat	 the	 fundamental	 purpose	 of	 this	 form	 of	 governance.	 This	
leaves	 those	 Coroners	more	 predisposed	 to	 organising	 their	 findings	 in	 part	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
family	wishes,	seemingly	in	an	untenable	position.	That	is,	if	the	statistics	their	actions	give	rise	
to	bear	only	a	passing	resemblance	 to	any	reasonable	approximation	of	actual	occurrences	of	
suicide,	perhaps	that	governmental	responsibility	should	be	dealt	with	elsewhere.		
	
Interestingly,	 Marsh	 (2010)	 also	 adopts	 a	 Foucaultian	 approach	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 the	
governmentalisation	of	suicide.	However,	not	only	does	he	address	the	manner	in	which	suicide	
was	brought	into	the	realm	of	the	knowable,	and	hence	manageable,	he	also	goes	on	to	examine	
the	way	in	which	this	phenomenon	was	re‐translated	into	a	matter	for	psychiatric	concern,	itself	
a	new	form	of	regulation	and	governance.	This	latter	issue	is	of	no	little	importance,	as	it	may	
well	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 ‘therapeutic’	 concern	 for	 the	 wellbeing	 of	 the	 grieving	 family	 is	 not	
simply	antithetical	 to	 the	management	of	contemporary	populations,	but	 instead	represents	a	
different	governmental	tactic,	deployed	within	the	same	overall	strategy.	
	
Therapeutic	jurisprudence	
The	 tension	 evidenced	 among	 the	 Coroners	 concerning	 the	 role	 of	 the	 family	 in	 suicide	
determination	appears	to	be	relatively	new,	as	there	is	 little	sign	of	it	 in	Burney’s	book	on	the	
English	 Coronial	 inquest	 during	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century	 and	 early	 twentieth	 century	
mentioned	 earlier.	What	may	 have	 happened	 here	 are	 the	 effects	 of	 what	 Freckelton	 (2008:	
576)	refers	to	as	the	rise	of	 ‘therapeutic	jurisprudence’,	defined	as	‘the	study	of	the	role	of	the	
law	as	a	therapeutic	agent’.		
	
Within	 this	 approach,	 the	 law	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 set	 of	 codes	 to	 be	 followed	without	 reflection,	
much	in	the	manner	of	Legal	Positivism;	such	codes	have	consequences	for	all	those	caught	up	
in	 the	proceedings.	As	 such,	 legal	 institutions	 and	 those	 charged	with	making	 them	work	 are	
now	 deemed	 to	 have	 some	 responsibility	 for	 the	 mental	 and	 emotional	 wellbeing	 of	 all	
participants.	King	(2008:	4)	is	quite	explicit	in	his	call	for	an	increasingly	therapeutic	approach	
to	Coronial	practice:	
	
Coroners’	 work	 is	 intimately	 connected	 with	 well‐being	 –	 a	 concern	 of	
therapeutic	 jurisprudence.	 Part	 of	 the	 Coroner’s	 role	 is	 to	 determine	 whether	
there	are	public	health	or	safety	issues	arising	out	of	the	death	and	whether	any	
action	 needs	 to	 be	 taken	 to	 remedy	 any	 problems,	 particularly	 those	 that	may	
cause	 future	 deaths	 …	 Moreover,	 the	 dead	 person’s	 family	 suffer	 grief	 and,	
depending	upon	circumstances	of	the	death,	significant	trauma.	
	
According	to	this	logic,	it	would	be	insufficient	for	a	Coroner	to	reach	a	finding	within	a	suicide	
inquest	without	considering	how	this	finding	might	impact	upon	those	left	behind	by	the	death.	
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Coroners	 would	 no	 longer	 be	 regarded,	 or	 regard	 themselves,	 as	 mere	 functionaries	 in	 the	
process	of	recording	death	statistics,	but	rather	they	would	have	a	therapeutic	role	to	play	in	the	
emotional	 and	 psychological	 health	 of	 their	 wider	 communities.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	
trauma	of	 losing	a	 loved	one	can	never	be	exacerbated	by	being	 told	 the	 truth	about	 it,	but	 it	
does	 suggest	 that	 the	Coroners’	 responsibilities	 lie	 beyond	 simply	determining	 the	 cause	 and	
circumstances	of	death.	As	Freckelton	(2008:	577)	states:	
	
Therapeutic	 jurisprudence	 …	 is	 in	 part	 a	 practical	 orientation	 towards	
minimizing	adverse	outcomes.	And	it	is	in	part	about	working	with	the	realities	of	
the	broad	repercussions	of	the	law	to	fashion	them	as	constructively	a	possible.		
	
At	 first	 glance,	 the	 apparent	 disregard	 held	 by	 some	 Coroners	 for	 the	 overtly	 administrative	
aspects	of	 their	post	–	 the	effective	sketching	out	of	 the	contours	of	community	 life;	numbers	
and	types	of	deaths	being	a	very	important	contour	–	raises	questions	about	just	what	Coroners’	
functions	ought	to	be,	and	how	these	functions	can	be	placed	in	relation	to	each	other.	
	
Binaries	of	governance	
The	evidence	suggests	that,	rather	than	simply	managing	the	data	of	death,	Coroners	now	form	
part	of	the	governance	of	a	more	subtle	component	of	the	population’s	health	and	welfare:	that	
of	 subjective	 experience.	That	 is,	particularly	on	 the	 issue	of	 suicide,	 they	now	appear	 to	be	a	
component	 of	 the	 administrative	 apparatus	 that	 manages	 the	 emotional	 wellbeing	 of	 the	
population.	 Marsh	 (2010)	 noted	 that	 suicide	 was	 brought	 into	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 statistically	
knowable,	and	from	there	pathologised	as	an	unfortunate	outcome	of	mental	disorder.	This	 is	
not	 a	 unique	 phenomenon	 but	 is	 instead	 an	 increasingly	 familiar	 tactic	 for	 the	 effective	
governance	of	subjectivity	(Tait:	1993,	2010).		
	
However,	while	‘mental	illness’	now	constitutes	one	of	the	central	indicators	of	a	likely	suicide,	
it	 by	no	means	 constitutes	 the	 full	 extent	of	 the	 role	played	by	 the	psy‐disciplines	within	 the	
field	of	suicide	determination,	a	fact	attested	to	by	the	concern	shown	by	Coroners	for	those	left	
behind.	Rose	(1990:	1)	notes	that	the	contemporary	government	of	 the	self/subjectivity	has	a	
number	 of	 components,	 all	 of	which	 speak	 to	 the	management	 of	 grieving	 families.	 First,	 the	
subjective	capacities	of	citizens	are	now	integral	to	the	workings	of	public	powers,	as	evidenced	
by	the	extensive	welfare	apparatus	targeting	the	psychological	health	of	the	population.	Second,	
it	 is	now	an	expectation	that	modern	organisations	(which	would	include	the	Coronial	courts)	
are	 charged	 with	 the	 task	 of	 managing	 subjectivity;	 as	 such,	 it	 would	 no	 longer	 be	 deemed	
appropriate	 for	 Coroner’s	 to	 simply	 ignore	 the	 emotional	 wellbeing	 of	 families.	 Finally,	 new	
forms	of	expertise	have	emerged	pertaining	to	the	government	of	subjectivity.	Arguably,	these	
new	forms	of	expertise	have	clustered	together	in	what	Rose	(1990)	refers	to	as	a	‘therapeutic	
community’;	it	may	well	be	the	case	that	Coroners	have	allocated	themselves	a	role	within	that	
community.		
	
From	the	evidence	emerging	from	the	observations	at	inquest	and	from	the	interviews	with	the	
Coroners,	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 Coroners	 have	 a	 significant	 part	 to	 play	 in	 the	 traditional	
governance	 of	 suicide	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 recording	 of	 death	 and	 the	 management	 of	 data.	
However,	it	appears	that	many	of	the	Coroners	feel	a	social	and	professional	obligation	within	
the	 practices	 of	 emotional	 governance.	 While	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 these	 two	 functions	 do	 not	
necessarily	sit	easily	alongside	each	other,	 it	 is	 important	to	avoid	describing	Coronial	suicide	
inquests	 as	 some	kind	of	 relatively	unsuccessful	 attempt	at	 achieving	a	unitary	governmental	
task:	 that	 of	 unfailingly	 accurate	 suicide	 determination.	 Likewise,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 not	 to	
construct	 some	 kind	 of	 simplistic	 governmental	 binary	 between	 the	 administrative	 and	 the	
therapeutic,	where	none	necessarily	exists.		
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In	his	book	on	education,	Hunter	(1994:	xxii)	notes	that	attempts	to	ascribe	singular	function	to	
the	 modern	 school	 –	 that	 of	 developing	 fully‐reasoned	 individuals	 –	 ignores	 the	 complex	
relationship	between	its	bureaucratic	components,	and	its	long	history	of	pastoral	guidance.		
	
There	 is	no	 ideal	or	complete	development	of	 the	person	underlying	the	school	
system	…	the	school	system	is	a	highly	impure,	tactically	improvised	institution,	
assembled	 from	different	 spheres	 of	 life	 and	 serving	 a	mixture	 of	 spiritual	 and	
worldly	ends.	
	
The	 English	 Coronial	 inquest	 appears	 to	 have	 equally	 complex	 relationships	 between	 its	
bureaucratic,	its	democratic,	its	scientific	and,	latterly,	its	pastoral	functions,	relationships	that	
have	yet	 to	be	 fully,	 or	 even	partially,	 resolved.	 It	would	 consequently	be	overly‐simplistic	 to	
place	 concerns	 over	 Coronial	 suicide	 determination	 within	 a	 dichotomous	 governmental	
problematic.	
	
Conclusion	
This	study	leads	to	three	central	observations.	First,	given	the	evidence	assembled	here,	 if	 the	
English	inquest	is	any	measure	of	the	idiosyncratic	and	locally‐organised	way	in	which	potential	
suicides	are	addressed	and	adjudicated	upon,	then	comparative	suicide	statistics	(both	local	and	
international)	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 inherently	 problematic.	 Without	 following	 the	 positivist	
suggestion	that	there	can	be	an	objective	truth	of	suicide	statistics,	that	we	can	somehow	come	
to	 know,	 it	 is	 still	 possible	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 ‘truths’	 produced	 through	 current	 statistical	 and	
administrative	 calculation	 should	be	 subject	 to	more	 effective	 reorganisation	 and	 refinement.	
Governance,	after	all,	is	a	continually	failing	operation	(Rose	and	Miller	1992),	and	while	it	may	
be	impossible	to	be	ontologically	‘right’,	there	are	thousands	of	ways	of	being	wrong.		
	
Second,	 while	 the	 English	 Coroners	 expressed	 near	 unanimous	 support	 for	 the	 stringent	
standard	of	proof	required	(in	spite	of	the	statistical	inaccuracies	this	most	certainly	produces),	
and	 unanimous	 support	 for	 the	 continued	 existence	 of	 a	 compulsory	 inquest	 for	 all	 potential	
deaths	by	suicide,	there	appears	to	be	few	advantages	in	Australia	adopting	the	same	protocols	
and	 procedures.	 The	 only	 argument	 that	 could	 run	 counter	 to	 this	 would	 involve	 a	 greater	
emphasis	upon	therapeutic	models	of	Coronial	practice,	which	would	lean	towards	emphasising	
the	benefits	 of	 suicide	 inquests	 in	 aiding	 the	 grieving	process	 of	 bereaved	 families.	Given	 the	
problems	 outlined	 above,	 and	 given	 Australia	 has	 no	 historical	 expectation	 of	 an	 inquest,	 let	
alone	 the	high	costs	 involved	and	 the	extra	workload	placed	upon	 that	nation’s	already	 taxed	
Coroners,	this	seems	highly	unlikely.		
	
Finally,	 the	 important	 question	 arises:	 what	 is	 the	 principal	 role	 of	 the	 inquest	 in	 suicide	
investigations?	 There	 seems	 to	 be	 little	 agreement	 among	 the	 English	 Coroners	 interviewed.	
While	most	understand	and	accept	their	role	within	the	governmental	regulation	of	death,	this	
often	 seemed	 secondary	 to	 their	 less	 tangible	 pastoral	 role	 in	 helping	 the	 families	 deal	 with	
bereavement.	Still,	it	must	be	stated	this	is	not	an	invalid	or	inappropriate	role	for	Coroners	to	
have	adopted;	 such	management	of	 community	 emotional	wellbeing	 constitutes	an	 important	
function	 of	 governance,	 and	Coroners	 are	 as	well	 placed	 as	 any	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 process.	
However,	 the	 disagreement	 and	 relative	 confusion	 over	 their	 responsibilities	may	 eventually	
need	formal	clarification,	especially	since,	as	it	stands,	a	focus	on	the	therapeutic	components	of	
the	 position	 appears	 to	 be	 impacting	 on	 the	 ability	 of	 some	 Coroners	 to	 fulfill	 their	
administrative	 responsibility	 to	 the	 full.	 Given	 the	 importance	 of	 suicide	 statistics,	 this	 may	
require	significant	clarification.		
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1	This	study	constitutes	a	pilot	study	for	a	large,	comparative	study	between	English	and	Australian	Coronial	practice	
regarding	 suicide	 determination.	 The	 research	 was	 conducted	 within	 one	 geographic	 area	 within	 England;	 it	
consisted	 of	 two	 parts.	 First,	 observations	were	made	 at	 20	 public	 inquests	 into	 possible	 suicides.	 Contact	was	
made	with	each	Coronial	Office,	which	then	suggested	which	 inquests	 to	attend.	All	 the	 inquests	were	within	the	
same	part	of	England;	they	were	conducted	over	a	four	month	period,	some	lasting	two	days,	some	lasting	less	than	
an	hour;	most	took	between	3‐4	hours.	The	inquests	attended	reached	a	variety	of	different	conclusions	in	addition	
to	suicide,	including	accident,	open	verdicts,	and	narrative	verdicts.	The	second	part	of	the	research	involved	semi‐
structured	interviews,	which	were	informed	by	observation	made	at	the	inquests.	These	were	conducted	with	six	
coroners	 who	 had	 presided	 over	 the	 above	 inquests.	 Once	 again,	 all	 were	 from	 the	 same	 part	 of	 England.	 The	
interviews	 were	 conducted	 over	 a	 two	 month	 period;	 generally,	 they	 lasted	 about	 an	 hour,	 and	 they	 were	
conducted	in	a	variety	of	locations.		
2	The	transcripts	were	coded	and	analysed	by	the	authors	with	particular	attention	to	recurring	themes.	
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